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ABSTRACT 
 
The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), one of the most important secular 
socio-political movements of the Middle East, has addressed gender issues 
since its foundation in the late 1970s. However, the question of women's 
freedom acquired a central position after the 2000s, when the PKK 
underwent a deep ideological and structural transformation. A foundational 
tenet is "democratic modernity", based on a democratic, ecological and 
gender-emancipatory system. For Abdullah Ocalan, the main leader of the 
PKK, democracy and freedom can only be achieved through the 
emancipation of women. Kurdish women have appropriated Ocalan's ideas 
and to a considerable extent, succeeded in promoting the empowerment of 
women and advancement of gender equality in the Kurdish societies directly 
influenced by the PKK: the diaspora and territories in Turkey and Syria.  
Although they still face a continuous and dual struggle against gender and 
ethnic oppression, Kurdish women have reached a high political status. As 
"guerrilleras", members of parliament, and human rights activists, they have 
disseminated the principles of gender equality throughout Kurdish society. In 
addition to adopting gender parity in all social, political and military Kurdish 
organizations, women established autonomous bodies within those 
organizations, which function through a strong transnational network from the 
battlefields in Kurdistan to the diaspora. Within this network, female activists 
in Europe play a central political role. They are the ones who are directly 
committed to gaining international political leverage, and with this aim the 
use of human rights conventions as a platform for dialogue constitutes an 
essential step forward. Furthermore, they play a major role in formulating 
Kurdish claims in universal terms backed up by human rights instruments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 2014, the world finally began to recognize "Kurdish heroism". 
In the city of Kobane, in northern Syria, the brave Kurdish resistance against 
fierce attacks by the Islamic state (IS) began to be widely covered by 
mainstream media. Suddenly, Western democracies were introduced to 
"America's newest allies" (Watson and Tuysuz, 2014) against the 
fundamentalist Islamic terror: Syria's Kurdish minority. In addition to 
physically restraining IS's expansion, these fearless and determined 
combatants were cheered by the media as the heroic protectors of Western 
enlightened principles, freedom fighters against barbaric terrorists, defenders 
of secularism and democratic values against fanatical theocracy and 
totalitarianism - in sum, the very best of humanity" against "the very worst" 
(Wight, 2014). Moreover, western media headlines have ever since been 
obsessed with the participation of Kurdish female soldiers1 in the struggle 
against IS, portrayed as the "angels of Kobane" and "the Islamic State's 
worse nightmare". The images of brave women standing alongside men, 
unveiled, challenging the most recent and perverse form of radical jihadism, 
could not but gain the greatest esteem in the eyes of the West.  
 However, neither the roots of the "Kurdish problem", nor the 
motivations and ideologies of those "Amazons of Mesopotamia" are explored 
properly by mainstream media. While the world remains silent on Western 
responsibility for Middle East conflicts, the media profits from sensationalist 
statements. The struggle for which thousands of Kurdish women and men 
give their lives dates far back and is extremely complex. It did not begin as a 
response to IS, nor is the fanatical organization the only opposing force to 
the Kurds. The appalling atrocity of IS has been bravely fought by Kurdish 
forces, with only occasional insufficient support from Western powers. 
However, even more difficult is the task of changing complex political and 
societal structures that encourage the birth of fundamentalist organizations 																																																								
1 It is important to highlight that mainstream media confuses the Peshmerga women, 
who are the combatants of the regular army of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG), in Iraq, and the Yapajas (YPJ), the female units of the Democratic Union 
Party (PYD), the main Kurdish party in Syria. The ones who fight in north Syria are 
the Yapajas.  
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and prevent Kurds from implementing the democratic principles they defend 
with such fierceness.    
 Kurdish women fight a continuous and dual struggle: against gender 
oppression within a traditional patriarchal society, and ethnic oppression as 
members of an oppressed people within a state. Women largely join the PKK 
to escape oppressive living conditions, but as social and political agents they 
consciously opt to join a liberation movement that is engaged in a deep 
social transformation through women's liberation. 
 Kurdish women are not the first female combatants, nor the only ones 
to be fighting at this very moment. Nonetheless, the contemporary Kurdish 
political movement, which comprises a guerrilla2 army, is grounded on a 
particular ideology based on gender equality. The participation of Kurdish 
women is not restricted to front line combatants in a desperate war for 
survival. They are political agents across the various levels of the Kurdish 
movement. Furthermore, they created their own independent movement 
within this movement, as well as their own army, party and philosophy (Sellar, 
2014). Thus, what makes it worth dying for Kobane is the concrete possibility 
to establish a revolutionary social project built on the ideology developed by 
Abdullah Ocalan (Dirik, 2014). Ocalan is the main leader of the Kurdistan 
Worker's Party (PKK) - an armed organization listed as a terrorist 
organization by the United States and the European Union.   
 This dissertation aims to ascertain the impact of Kurdish women 
activists on gender equality within the PKK, its affiliated organizations, and 
Kurdish society at large. In this sense, it contributes to the wider literature on 
the Kurdish contemporary political movement and examines the Kurdish 
women's movement through a human rights perspective. It also contributes 
to an anthropological perspective of the political mobilization of Kurds under 
the PKK, as it highlights the perceptions of the subjects involved and 
																																																								
2  The word "guerrilla" will be used to make reference to armed militants who 
represent local peoples struggling against colonialist and repressive regimes. Their 
aim is not only to overcome the state's forces, but also to establish a revolutionary 
project that dramatically changes the status quo (Gross, 2015, p.3-4). More detailed 
discussions on the organization, aims and tactics of the Kurdish guerrilla, as well as 
the larger structures that surpass the military wing, are explored in chapter one.          
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considers how they make sense of the PKK as a political project that 
responds to Kurdish yearning for liberation.   
 Various works address the development of a new ideological 
framework and the organizational reconstruction of the PKK (and its affiliated 
organizations) after Ocalan's imprisonment in 1999 (Casier and Jongerden, 
2012; Akkaya, 2011; Akkaya and Jongerden, 2012; Grojean, 2014). The 
diaspora studies emphasize the positive steps made by the Kurdish 
movement to develop a human rights platform and establish a political 
dialogue (Baser, 2013a, 2013b; Khayati, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2005). 
Although the development of a new political discourse on women's issues 
and the mobilization of women are mentioned, the first studies do not place 
the empowerment of women and their recently assumed roles as central 
elements in the process of transformating the PKK. Nor do the diaspora 
studies outline the role developed by women as political agents who 
contribute to the internationalization of the Kurdish issue and promotion of 
human rights within the Kurdish movement and in society at large.   
 Some studies focus on Kurdish feminism within the Turkish context 
(Çaha, 2011; Diner and Toktas, 2010), but they do not consider the influence 
of the women's movement within the PKK on the establishment of Kurdish 
feminism. Çaglayan (2012), whose article is part of a series organized by 
Casier and Jongerden (2012), is one of the few exceptions to focus on both 
the transformation of the Kurdish movement's ideological discourse from a 
gender perspective and how it served to engage women in the political 
struggle. She directly discusses some of Ocalan's ideas and the possible 
contradictions of the PKK's discursive transformation. To date, discussions 
on Ocalan's ideological framework on women's liberation, and how this 
framework is being realized by the Kurdish women's movement, have been 
taken up only by Kurdish women activists and academics (Dirik, 2014, 2015; 
Guneser, 2014).  
 Methodologically, the present work is essentially based on "cyber 
ethnography" and the analyses of primary and secondary sources. "Cyber 
ethnography" here can be understood as the observation of political activism 
through the Web, where the virtual space is used as an online fieldwork, 
through which it is possible to "follow" the actions of organizations, publishing 
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of ideas, and interactions between different actors. Primary sources consist 
of the online material produced by Kurdish activists and organizations (social 
and media) that make reference to their political projects and organized 
actions, as well as conference speeches, interviews, videos, institutional 
websites and Facebook pages. Also included are direct observations made 
by non-Kurdish activists. Moreover, Ocalan's writings are embraced in this 
category, as his ideas are analysed within the context of Kurdish ideological 
and political discourse3. Secondary sources consist of a selection of literature 
and online newspaper articles, including updated information on recent 
political developments.   
 The analyses presented in this dissertation are a result of five years of 
observation of the Kurdish question, during which I developed a particular 
interest in Kurdish women's activism. Since 2010, I have worked on the 
production of documentary films on various issues concerning the Kurds, 
which granted me the opportunity to visit the Kurdish regions in Turkey and 
Iraq (including the Kandil mountains where the PKK is based) on different 
occasions, for several days each time. During these stays I was able to 
observe the full engagement of women in political life and signals of the 
transformation of gender power relations within family groups. In Europe, I 
am in consistent contact with Kurdish activists from Turkey and Syria, as well 
as with Kurdish organizations, which allows me a continuous exchange of 
information. Being based in Strasbourg, France, I am able to follow 
demonstrations and actions addressed to the Council of Europe. Thus, I 
indirectly use information collected through varied  "fieldworks" and 
interviews over a span of years.  
 The first chapter briefly reviews Kurdish history, highlighting important 
historical events that contributed to the emergence of the "Kurdish question", 
the circumstances that fomented the formation of the PKK, and the 
consolidation of the PKK as the most important contemporary Kurdish 
movement. The chapter also examines the conditions that motivated the 
																																																								
3 As I do not read Turkish, I was restricted to English compilations of Ocalan's 
writings, and to articles published on the PKK webpage. Despite the limitation, those 
materials provide a comprehensive understanding of Ocalan's ideas.    
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Kurdish dispersion after the 1980s, especially towards Europe, giving birth to 
an important transnational movement.    
 The second chapter explores Ocalan's main ideas on women's 
liberation and how they dialogue with human rights principles, particularly 
those of women's empowerment and gender equality. Addressing the 
ideological basis of this "gender-emancipatory system" is essential for 
understanding the transformation of the overall Kurdish movement. Likewise, 
it is fundamental for making sense of the Kurdish women's movement and 
understanding the basis on which an international political network was 
established.     
 The third chapter is divided in two sections. The first addresses the 
establishment of the Kurdish women's movement, from its emergence as a 
result of an "exile experience" (Van Bruneissen, 2000) that succeeded in 
combining women's experiences in Kurdistan and the diaspora4, to its rise to 
a solid transnational network. It also explores how Kurdish women have 
appropriated Ocalan's ideas and realized the principles of women's 
empowerment and gender equality. The second section addresses the 
women's movement in Europe and its role in promoting human rights in 
Kurdistan and the diaspora. Chapter three also includes a focus on the main 
activities in 2014 and 2015 of two women's organizations: the International 
Representation of the Kurdish Women's Movement, based in Paris, and the 
Women's Meeting UTAMARA, based in Germany. Those organizations were 
chosen on the basis of their well-recognized work and the range of activity in 
which they engage. While the International Representation is responsible for 
lobbying and diplomatic relations aiming at disseminating the women's 
liberation ideology, the UTAMARA centre acts on the community-base level, 
working to empower women from a bottom-up perspective.     
 	
																																																								
4 The term "diaspora" references the Kurdish communities dispersed from their 
homelands, which maintain a collective memory and distinctive identity vis-à-vis the 
host countries, and are socially and politically committed to the homeland (Brubaker, 
2005).  
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1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM: 
AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE 
 
The Kurds are an ethno-linguistic group inhabiting the regions of Upper 
Mesopotamia, the Zagros Mountains and South-eastern Anatolia, which are 
divided among the modern states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. In the 
"cradle of civilization", various empires have struggled over millennia to 
expand and preserve their borders. In the early modern age, both the 
Ottoman and the Safavid Empires constantly used the Kurds for territorial 
occupation and defence, which led to the forced displacement and 
deportation of a large portion of the Kurdish population (Madih, 2007, pp. 12-
14). Those imperial politics gave rise to successive Kurdish rebellions during 
the Ottoman Empire and long after its dissolution. Over time, sporadic 
rebellions gave birth to Kurdish nationalistic movements, and much later to 
new political projects, such as Ocalan developed. In a history marked by 
violence, repression and massacres, the word "resistance" became 
synonymous with Kurd. 
 But not only local powers sought to preserve their interests over the 
region. The area historically occupied by Kurds, and claimed as Kurdistan by 
40 million people - the largest ethnic group in the world without its own state - 
is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas and water. In the 
beginning of the 20th century, the geopolitical importance of oil-rich regions 
increased as oil began replacing coal as the most coveted natural resource. 
The role played by colonialist powers in the development of Kurdistan is of 
great significance. The current map of the Middle East was to a large extent 
redrawn according to Western interests, dramatically changing the lives of 
the diverse ethnic groups in the region. The unresolved "Kurdish question" 
concerns the global powers as much as it does Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran; 
it is an international problem (Uzun, 2014, p.9).    
 With the outbreak of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
the British and French were allowed to arbitrarily divide the Middle East. The 
regions of present-day Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine were placed under British 
mandate, with Syria and Lebanon under French mandate. With that, the 
Kurdish question - following the discussions about Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, 
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Palestine and Armenia - became a subject of debate among the great 
powers (Cigerli, 1999, p. 103).          
 In August 1920, the Allied Powers and Turkey signed the Treaty of 
Sèvres, which recognized a Kurdish region within the limits of Anatolia. 
Within six months, a commission composed of members appointed by the 
British, French and Italian governments would draft a scheme of local 
autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas (Article 62). It even 
established the right of the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 
62 to claim independence (Article 64) (Treaty of Peace with Turkey, 1920). 
However, the proposed peace treaty was never ratified.  
  The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), led by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk with the support of the Kurdish Notables1, succeeded in 
abolishing the Ottoman Sultanate and aborting the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1923 
the warring parties signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the new 
Republic of Turkey in place of the former Ottoman Empire. However, the 
establishment of the modern Turkish frontiers did not take into account the 
political aims of non-Turkish nationalities, such as Armenians, Kurds and 
Greeks, who, like the Turks, had historically occupied the Anatolian region 
(Akçam, 2004).  
 From then on, the Kurdish regions were divided among four 
neighbouring states: Turkey (controlling the majority of the Kurdish territory), 
Iraq (under British mandate until 1932), Syria (under French mandate until 
1946), and Iran2. In each of these countries, the Kurds would struggle 
against violent and oppressive policies, agitating for the right to speak their 
language and even the right to life. 
 Like other newly emerged states after the First World War, politically 
vulnerable and keen to preserve its recently acquired independence and 
territorial integrity, the Republic of Turkey heavily guarded the principles of 																																																								
1 The notables were leaders "who exercised authority over local populations and 
possessed some sort of political power in their relationship to the state" (Ozoglu, 
2001, p.384).  
   
2 Part of the Kurdish region was already under Persian control since the 16th 
century, when an agreement between the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires divided 
the Kurdish region in two great zones of influence.     
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unification and centralization. Any mobilisation of the Kurdish people3 was 
considered a threat to state unity and repressed by the Turkish state. 
Furthermore, throughout the years various programs of "assimilation" of 
alternative identities were implemented, aiming at a complete "Turkification" 
of the state (Yildiz and Breau, 2010).  
 As early as the first year of the Republic, the government prohibited all 
schools, associations and publications that made use of the Kurdish 
language. At the same time, a Decree-Law prohibited the use of the words 
"Kurds" and "Kurdish" in all national publications as well as in daily usage 
(Akin, 2004). The Turkish Penal Code (TPC) was enacted in 1926, just after 
the suppression of the first Kurdish rebellion against the Republic of Turkey. 
Articles 141 and 142 of the TPC prohibited organizations and propaganda 
"seeking to destroy or weaken nationalist feelings", leading to an arbitrary 
suppression of the freedom of expression, and enforcing a means of 
harassment or persecution (Hensler and Muller, 2005, pp.20-21), as the 
courts interpreted it to include non-violent expressions of Kurdish identity 
(such as literature and music). The suppression of these rights was central to 
the growth of the "Kurdish problem" (Avebury, 1996) and remains so today. 
  
 
PKK: The search for social change  
 
After a few years of preparatory mobilisation, a group of young men and 
women based in Ankara formally founded the Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK) in November 1978. Headed by Abdullah Ocalan, the group of students, 
also including Turkish comrades, followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
aimed at an independent Kurdistan.   
 The formative years of the PKK as an organization coincided with the 
martial law established after Turkey's third military coup in September 1980. 
Under martial law, the repression of the Kurdish population increased 
dramatically, evidenced in the number imprisoned and the extent of 																																																								
3 The Kurds form the largest minority group of Turkey. According to Yildiz and Breau 
(2010), in 2010 it represented approximately 23% (15 to 20 million people) of the 
total Turkish population (69 million). 
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systematic torture. As described by Kutschera (1994, p.13), prisoners were 
brought to court in metal cages loaded on trucks and could hardly walk or 
stand. Several prisoners held hunger strikes for more than a month in year to 
protest the harsh prison conditions; some committed suicide by self-
immolation. An authoritarian new constitution - which is still in force - was 
instituted in 1982, replacing the second Constitution from 1961. It severely 
limited individual rights, restricted press freedom, and reduced the influence 
of trade unions. The regime focused on breaking the Kurdish resistance, and 
took extreme measures to achieve its goals. All expressions of Kurdish 
identity were classified as terrorist activities (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002, p.91).  
 Within this context of political instability and authoritarianism, legal 
ways of organizing a national movement seemed to be exhausted, opening 
the path to armed resistance. Just prior to the 1980 coup Ocalan left through 
Syria to a Palestinian refugee camp in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, where he 
succeed in establishing a military training camp. The news of torture and 
persecution, as well as preparations of guerrilla warfare under Ocalan, 
encouraged mass support for the PKK. Many people joined the guerrilla, as it 
was considered a legitimate defence force against Turkish repression (Uzun, 
2014).   
 After a few years of military, ideological and political training4, the PKK 
launched its military offensive against Turkey in 1984, attacking gendarme 
forts in the cities of Semdinli and Eruh. The assaults also marked the 
creation of its military branch, which developed into a professional guerrilla 
army. The Turkish regime responded in force, and more than ever the 
Kurdish problem was treated as a security issue rather than a matter of 
human rights. The following years were marked by violent clashes between 
PKK fighters and the Turkish army.  
 The military coup not only prompted an armed resistance, but also the 
establishment of a powerful transnational network favourable to the PKK. 
Due to intense repression and mass arrests, hundreds of thousands of 																																																								
4 Ocalan stayed in Syria until 1998, when under international pressure he was 
expelled. The almost two decades of ideological and political training in Syrian 
territory accounts for the prominence of the PKK's ideology in Rojava. Finally, the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) was founded in 2003 following the same principles of 
the PKK.  
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Turkish citizens entered Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium to 
escape persecution (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002, p.91). At the same time, high-level 
PKK militants were purposely sent to Europe in order to organize people in 
the diaspora. As early as 1985, the Kurdistan National Liberation Front 
(ERNK) was established with the aim of carrying out political development 
and mass mobilization. Peasantry, youth, women, tradesmen, workers, 
people abroad, elders, religious groups, each section of society should be 
organized. A network of community and cultural centres in Europe, backed 
by political, civil and cultural rights, made it possible to legally implement 
ERNK ideals. Simultaneously, those activities reinforced mass support for 
the PKK and allowed fundraising that financed and expanded the guerrilla 
activities in Kurdistan (Gunes, 2012). 
 Popular mobilization is one of the pillars of the PKK and one of the 
reasons for its success. As a guerrilla movement, the PKK includes both a 
military cadre of trained fighters and a political wing responsible for providing 
a multitude of supporting services. A guerrilla war cannot be effectively 
waged without the support of a vast political organization that far outweighs 
the size of the army. It is through this political network that the guerrilla 
organization raises money, buys arms, secures allies, and provides basic 
services to insurgents, such as health and education. Guerrilla tactics, 
therefore, comprise various facets operating on different levels, from military 
operations to economic warfare and public diplomacy. At the local level, 
insurgents are consistently trying to spread their ideology and recruit support. 
Nationally, they are engaged in gaining independence and overcoming a 
deep-rooted regime. Internationally, they cultivate support among the world 
community, which recently acquired a special prominence (Gross, 2015, p.4).           
 As Turkey invested in military repression and the suppression of 
political, civil and cultural rights, the PKK increased its popular support. From 
1990 onwards, popular expressions of Kurdish identity took place across 
Turkish Kurdistan and throughout the diaspora, with the PKK as a vocal 
social movement. Despite the violent repression of the Turkish state for 
several years, mass celebrations of the Newroz, a New Year festival, 
continue to be held annually. In Europe, 50,000 to 100,000 people from 
various countries attend annual Kurdistan peace festivals and rallies (Gunes, 
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2012). The PKK succeeded to situate the Newroz as a Kurdish symbol of 
resistance and an affirmation of a unified Kurdish identity, constructing a 
counter-hegemonic apparatus against the hegemonic culture (Delal, 2005).  
  It is important to highlight that the Kurds have been continuously 
exposed to an "exile experience" and learned how to benefit from it. 
According to Van Bruneissen (2000), the awareness of Kurdistan as a 
homeland, and of the Kurds as a distinct people, has often been strongest 
among those Kurds who lived elsewhere, were exposed to modern ideas and 
had the opportunity to study in other languages. It was this exile experience 
that brought together educated Kurds from different national contexts and 
helped them to imagine a unified Kurdistan as a common homeland. It was 
precisely the exile experience that made it possible to transform Kurdistan 
from a vaguely defined geographical entity into a political ideal.  
  The emergence and consolidation of the PKK is based on this exile 
experience. It was far from the rural and provincial Kurdistan that a group of 
Kurdish university students, influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas, developed 
their political principles. It is worth mentioning that the 1970s were marked by 
the emergence of social movements worldwide that questioned hierarchical 
social structures and aimed at more egalitarian societies. On a global scale, 
youthful political parties and organizations were created to target the old 
structures, which were pitted as symbols of oppression. Particularly, the 
world order was questioned, and colonized cultures increased their political 
awareness in search for change and political autonomy.  
 The PKK rapidly increased its legitimacy among people and attracted 
youth due to the fact that it targeted two sources of oppression: the Turkish 
state, seen as the colonizer, and the tribal Kurdish chieftains, the aghas, 
regarded as exploiters and collaborators of the state. Poor farmers were 
obliged to work for the chieftains with few opportunities for other types of 
work or schooling (Westrheim, 2008). Unlike most previous Kurdish political 
parties, which were organized around tribal leaders and structures, the PKK 
originated from the leftist movement in Turkey and its leaders derived from 
lower classes (Akkaya, 2011). The conservative ideologies imposed by 
traditional leaders were replaced by a revolutionary attempt to educate and 
liberate people (Westrheim, 2008).  
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 With the collapse of Socialism, new global developments and political 
outcomes in Kurdistan, the party developed new strategies and adopted new 
paradigms. As a result of this transformation, it changed from a party to a 
congressional system. On the ideological level, it abandoned the goal of an 
independent Kurdistan and embraced the thesis of "democratic modernity", 
based on a democratic, ecological and gender-emancipatory system (Uzun, 
2014, p.21). 
 Highlighting those positive aspects cannot allow an idyllic image of the 
PKK. As argued by Akkaya and Jongerden (2012), most of the works 
addressing the PKK tend to treat it as an anomaly rather than trying to make 
sense of it. Regardless of political views and personal affinities, it is a fact 
that in a very short time period, the PKK evolved from a small clandestine 
organization into a transnational social-political movement with thousands of 
armed guerrillas (men and women), an extensive mass media complex, and 
several civil organizations in Turkey, as well as in many European countries 
(Akkaya, 2011). Only through a critical review of the circumstances that 
motivated the creation of the PKK - and its ideological basis - can one 
understand the claim of a representative number of Kurds and begin to 
comprehend what is required to establish long-term peace and stability. Even 
if it can be argued that the PKK does not represent the entirety of the Kurdish 
population - it is difficult to imagine that such a numerous population could be 
homogeneously represented - it is unquestionably the main Kurdish political 
actor in the contemporaneity. Ocalan is recognized as the political and 
philosophical leader of the majority of Kurds in Turkey, Syria and the 
diaspora, which is evident in the ideological and political framework of 
various parties and civil society organizations.  
 In sum, three key elements have to be considered for a better 
understanding of why the PKK achieved a central position as the legitimate 
representative of the Kurdish population. Firstly, it emerged as a supra-tribal 
resistance that transcended social and geographic boundaries (Ozcan, 2002). 
Secondly, it is based on a political education that fosters personal 
development, dignity and a sense of empowerment (Westrheim, 2008). 
Thirdly, and not yet sufficiently explored at an academic level, it struggles for 
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a women's revolution. These three elements are interconnected and 
influence each other's development.          
 It is the third element that will be explored in the next chapter. Through 
the analysis of Ocalan's main ideas on women's freedom, I discuss how 
those ideas dialogue with the principles of women's empowerment and 
gender equality.   
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2. OCALAN AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION IDEOLOGY 
 
Ocalan developed a comprehensive approach to women's liberation. His 
theoretical analyses are complemented by practical discussions on the ways 
through which women can be empowered. Besides developing a socio-
historical analysis of the establishment of the patriarchal system and how 
women are oppressed by it, he encourages them to surpass engendered 
roles and create their own movements and institutions.  
 From a human rights perspective, women's empowerment can be 
understood as the bottom-up process of transforming gender power relations, 
through which women will be able to formulate and advocate their own 
visions for their societies, including gender norms. Thus, empowerment 
entails change, as to be empowered means to have been disempowered in 
the first place. In other words, it means gaining the ability to make choices, 
which requires alternatives - or the capacity for meaningful choice - and the 
ability to recognize that alternatives exist. In regards to gender power 
relations, this last condition is essential, as gender often operates through 
the unquestioned acceptance of power (Kabeer, 2005).  
 Ocalan's analyses of the process of enslavement of women aims to 
denaturalize gender power relations and encourage the transformation of 
these relations. His critical review of the history of civilization asserts that this 
5000-year-history is essentially the history of the enslavement of women. 
Consequently, he asserts that women's freedom "will only be achieved by 
waging a struggle against the foundation of this ruling system" (Ocalan, 2013, 
p.9). According to him, the Neolithic Era was dominated by a matriarchal 
society1 where the "mother-woman" had a privileged position. He claims that 
Neolithic peoples maintained a social order of equality based on communal 
property, sharing and solidarity, and a lack of institutionalized hierarchies; 
with the disintegration of the Neolithic society, women lost their position.  																																																								
1  Although from an anthropological point of view no known societies are 
unambiguously matriarchal, archaeological evidence suggest that women were held 
in esteem prior to the rise of urban societies (Ahmed, 1992, p.11). However, it is not 
the aim of the present dissertation to discuss the scientific validity of Ocalan's 
arguments, but to show that he develops important arguments to deconstruct 
androcentric interpretations that claim a natural inferior social status of women.  
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 Two "major sexual ruptures" took place during this historical process 
of gender enslavement. The first was the disruption of the home economy 
organized around the family-clan unit, which established a hierarchical 
division of labour, with women's work at the bottom. At the same time, 
mythological narratives emerged to legitimize the idea of men as rulers. With 
the development of institutionalized religions, this gendered imbalance of 
power was also institutionalized, and the patriarchal system became deep-
rooted.  
 The establishment of patriarchy and the development of monotheistic 
religions led to the "second major sexual rupture", with the treatment of 
women as inferior becoming a "sacred commandment of god". The new 
monotheistic cultures adopted the system of concubinage and 
institutionalized polygamy. Christianity, and later Islam (with the multiplication 
of harems) contributed to the full implementation of sexist societies. Through 
a process of "housewifization", women became restricted to the private 
space of the house and to housework, and not seen as economically 
productive.  
 According to Ocalan, if history has already seen two major sexual 
ruptures, he predicts a third one in the future, this time "against the dominant 
male". The possibility of promoting a new "sexual rupture" is the motivating 
force of the Kurdish women's freedom movement. As an external observer, I 
ask: Why would men within the PKK agree to overcome gender power 
relations? Ocalan's analyses also aim to demonstrate that the enslavement 
of women leads to the enslavement of men. Gender enslavement was just 
the first type of enslavement in history. Within the process of accumulation of 
surplus and institutionalization of ownership, women's enslavement became 
the model for all other enslaved lives - that of children and men - and 
housewifization was extended to society as a whole. Therefore, 
housewifization became the institutional foundation upon which all types of 
slavery and moral corruption were implemented (Ocalan, 2013, p.27).    
 From the first civilizations to the establishment of modern capitalism, 
people lost their freedom. Capitalism is based on the exploitation of the 
labour force, with the nation-state as the ideal system for the exercise of 
power. Nation-states spread sexism, nationalism, and militarism: all 
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ideologies of power. In this sense, capitalism and the nation-state represent 
the dominant male in institutionalized form. Capitalist society is the 
perpetuation of the old exploitative societies based on continuous warfare 
against women (Ocalan, 2013, p.43). As an alternative to the nation-state 
model, Ocalan developed the paradigm of "democratic confederalism", 
whereby society is not controlled by the state, but is based on grassroots 
participation and a community-based decision-making process. Within this 
system, delegates to the general assemblies form the higher levels of 
representation and are limited to the duty of coordination and implementation 
of the collective will (Ocalan, 2011, p.33)2. This representational system is 
already in practice within all Kurdish organizations in Turkey, Syria and the 
diaspora, including the women's organizations.     
 If state is the highest level of the patriarchal system, family is the stem 
cell of state society. Through the patriarchal family, the state reinforces its 
power and apparatus, as slavery becomes entrenched within the family. 
When women are married they become the property of men and are barred 
from political, intellectual, social and economic arenas. Ocalan explicitly 
criticizes the traditional family culture of the Middle East, which he considers 
the main source of local problems. The traditional family arrangements are 
the foundational basis of the degradation of women, bringing inequality, 
illiteracy, family feuds, and honour disputes (Ocalan, 2013, pp.36-37). Thus, 
the traditional family is the perpetuation of state violence. For Ocalan, the 
transformation of society relies on the transformation of the institution of 
family through the abolishment of two practices: male ownership over women 
and children, and the obligation (imposed on women) to have children as a 
condition to sustain marriage. A truly democratic civilization will only be 
established through the development of meaningful family unions and the 
abolition of discrimination in family relations.        
 Ocalan argues that to defeat the oppressive system it is necessary to 
develop a new approach to women, men and their relationship, which will 
allow the "third sexual rupture". Killing the dominant male means killing "one-																																																								
2 According to Ocalan (2011), this alternative system is especially appropriate for 
the Middle East, where capitalist imperial powers will not be able to impose 
democracy. The elementary grassroots democracy is the only approachable to 
affect such change across diverse ethnic and religious differences.      
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sided domination, inequality and intolerance. Moreover, it is to kill fascism, 
dictatorship and despotism" (Ocalan, 2013, p.51). What is important to 
consider in Ocalan's theoretical approach is that he situates women's 
freedom as a primary goal. As already discussed, he broke with the nation-
state model, which is viewed as contrary to a "gender emancipatory system" 
and inadequate to the establishment of free society. Contrary to nationalist 
projects that result in perpetuating hegemonic masculinity, and the silence 
regarding gender equality and sexuality in national liberation movements in 
the Middle East, Ocalan directly addresses women's freedom as the first step 
to transform society. In this sense, he argues that the question of state 
cannot be tackled previously to the question of family. They are interrelated 
issues that make up social phenomena and need to be analysed as a whole. 
A bottom-up transformation is required.   
 Ocalan emphasizes: "the solutions for all social problems in the Middle 
East should have woman’s position as focus" (Ocalan, 2013, p.52). The 
realization of the third sexual rupture is the moment to implement gender 
equality, which is the fundamental component of freedom and democracy. 
Gender equality means women having the same opportunities as men in all 
fields, including the ability to participate in the public sphere. For Ocalan, who 
criticizes the very basic process of housewifisation, women shall be liberated 
from all forms of subjugation and fully restore their position in society, 
especially in political life. But this political participation is not restricted to 
joining "male-made" institutions. Women should establish their own 
organizations and develop their own political platforms. This requires a 
comprehensive political organization, including all levels of society: human 
rights groups, social organizations, local governance, and political parties. 
Hence, Ocalan recognizes the specific needs and interests of women and 
enlarges the notion of gender equality, approaching the necessity to 
implement gender equity. He encourages a transformative change beyond 
equality of opportunity, as he endorses that women shall be able to 
independently organize themselves, discuss their own needs, and find their 
own solutions.    
 Moreover, political action can only be successful with a parallel effort 
on the ideological level. The patriarchal mentality - and the nation state 
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model - must be overthrown in order to establish a democratic, gender equal, 
and eco-friendly society. According to Ocalan, this can only be achieved 
through the development of "the science of women", or "Jineolojî" in Kurdish. 
Which means, in other words, an epistemological process aimed at the 
radical transformation of the dominant male mentality within scientific 
knowledge. Thus, scientific branches centred on women's issues and 
perspectives - such as women social sciences, women history, history of 
women sexuality and so - should be developed, and "women's academies" 
created as alternative access points to education.   
 Finally, in a clear calling for participation in the liberation movement, 
Ocalan asserts that it is up to women and youth to ensure the transformation 
and democratization of the Middle East. In a leadership position, women 
have the double potential to overcome the social inequalities of the region, 
and promote the reconciliation of society globally.  
 In the next chapter I address the establishment of a transnational 
Kurdish women's movement and its role in promoting gender equality and 
human rights. As concrete examples, I focus on the activities developed by 
two organizations in the diaspora. 
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3. THE KURDISH WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: 
A HISTORY OF RESISTANCE 
 
In 9 August 2013 three Kurdish female activists were murdered in the centre 
of Paris, in an apartment that hosted the Kurdistan Information Office: Sakine 
Cansiz, founding member of the PKK and political refugee in France; Fidan 
Dogan, representative of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) in Paris; 
and Leyla Saylemez, member of the Kurdish Youth Movement. They were 
cruelly shot in the head just one month after the beginning of the "Imrali 
Peace Process", the peace negotiations undertaken by Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, Turkey's Prime Minister at the occasion, and Abdullah Ocalan, 
leader of the PKK. After two years of investigation the prosecutor of Paris 
finally made his final submission, and for the first time the French justice 
evoked the possible involvement of a foreign intelligence service in a political 
murder committed in France. Already denounced by Kurdish activists and by 
the Turkish media itself, which published several pieces of evidence, the 
National Intelligence Organization of Turkey was quite likely responsible for 
the crime (Seelow, 2015).          
 Whoever is proven guilty, the crime was intentionally planned in order 
to sabotage the peace process. Moreover, it had a deeper symbolic 
meaning: it targeted women, not men. The Kurdish women are symbols of 
resistance, and the pillars of a revolutionary social project that has been 
successively put in place by the PKK, the political parties and the various civil 
society organizations that follow the same ideological principles. In fact, 
those principles, which include gender equality, are far from being privileged 
by the Turkish political framework, especially by the AKP, Erdogan's party. 
President of Turkey since 2014, Erdogan is widely known to negatively 
address women and narrowly define their supposed role in society. For 
instance, he claimed at a summit in Istanbul that gender equality is "against 
nature" and that according to Islam the "role" of women is maternity 
(Dearden, 2014). Just a few days ago, the Deputy Prime-Minister Bülent 
Arinç told a female MP from the People's Democratic Party (HDP) to "shut up 
as a woman". She was responding to him during an extraordinary session to 
discuss recent terrorist attacks (Today's Zaman, 2015). Although absurd, 
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these comments are not surprising since Erdogan had already stated that 
women should have three children, and that abortion rights, as well as 
access to the morning-after pill, should be limited (Dearden, 2014). 
 Since the emergence of the PKK, Kurdish women have been 
consolidating their new position in Kurdish society - and consequently in 
Turkish society as a whole. They have proven to be political agents perfectly 
capable to act and make decisions side-by-side with men. They equally take 
up arms to defend their rights as Kurds (and as women); they are elected as 
politicians; they head various administrative and human rights organizations; 
they are arrested and tortured as much as men, and they equally resist in the 
name of a broader struggle. If they choose, they are all of that and also wives 
and mothers. Gradually, women engaged in the liberation movement are 
succeeding to filter down into society principles of gender equality, explicitly 
defended by Ocalan.      
 Besides her historical position as one of the founders of the PKK, 
Sakine Cansiz owes her recognition to her brave resistance to brutal torture 
in the Diyarbakir Prison, where she remained for about 11 years and 
continued to lead the Kurdish movement. Between 1981 and 1989, 34 of her 
fellow inmates died of torture, and hundreds suffered lasting injury. When 
released, she joined the PKK training camp in the Bekaa Valley, and 
afterwards the armed struggle in Northern Iraq, where she started to 
organize the women's movement inside the organization. Known as "a 
legend among PKK members" (Letsch, 2013), she was an example of 
strength and determination to be followed by Kurds, men and women. Her 
dignity and political conviction motivated her contemporaries and the younger 
generation.    
 Killing Sakine Cansiz and the other two prominent female Kurdish 
activists was above all a symbolic murder; an attempt to literally silence 
women and re-establish (male) order. However, despite the shock and public 
outcry, Kurds - and Kurdish women - never gave up. The assassination of 
the three women in Paris resulted in permanent protests and continuous 
struggle to solve the case. Indeed, it reinforced the Kurdish motivation to 
"fight for freedom".      
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 In this last chapter I discuss the establishment of an organized and 
mobilized Kurdish women's movement. After analysing key issues to 
understand its emergence and operation as a transnational network, I focus 
on the activities developed by organizations in the diaspora, particularly in 
France and Germany, and how they have contributed to promote gender 
equality and human rights. 
 
From the mountains to Europe: The establishment of a transnational 
Kurdish women's network 
 
In addition to the emergence of the PKK and its consolidation as a social-
political movement, the Kurdish women's movement must be analysed in its 
transnational dimension. Due to the political situation in Turkey and the 
historical denial of fundamental human rights of its Kurdish population, the 
"exile experience" (Van Bruinessen, 2000), particularly in Europe, was a key 
element for the establishment of a Kurdish women's liberation movement. 
This experience led to the organization of women in a united front (Sellar, 
2014), which functions cooperatively - from the guerrilleras on the battlefields 
to women's organizations in the diaspora. Without understanding the 
emergence of this solid network and its transnational operation, one cannot 
properly address the role developed by women in the diaspora and how they 
have contributed to enhance gender equality within Kurdish society and 
society at large.              
 Women participated in the PKK since its foundation, and in the early 
1980s their participation in the guerrilla forces was already increasing rapidly. 
When the PKK launched its military offensive in 1984 women were among 
the ranks. As members of an oppressed ethnic minority they felt motivated to 
join a liberation movement. To be Kurdish was banned, and for women social 
inequalities and discriminatory politics have severe impacts. In a patriarchal 
society with very strict gender roles, joining the PKK meant much more than 
liberating Kurdish people; it seemed a possibility for changing a reality where 
women had very limited rights, and were always treated as inferior to men. 
The educative element of the PKK, which specifically target patriarchal 
structures and ideologies, was an important element of attraction for women. 
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As argued before, the PKK fosters the establishment of independent 
organizations for women, headed by women, and very rapidly women were 
empowered through a network of political education. Westrheim (2008) cites 
the fact that during the first years of war female guerrillas went to the villages 
not only to recruit women but also to make them aware of their subordinate 
position in a patriarchal society. This process of "consciousness raising", as 
analysed by the author, is a fundamental aspect of the PKK, and moved the 
arena of education and resistance from the traditional classroom to the 
various spheres of sociality, including the mountains, prisons, streets of 
Kurdistan and the diaspora. I would highlight that this process is especially 
important in regards to gender issues. The "consciousness raising" about the 
oppressive patriarchal system is the backbone of the Kurdish women's 
movement, from the mountains to the diaspora. Kurdish women are aware of 
the historical and social origins of the patriarchal system, and they are daily 
discussing the ways to overcome it. Furthermore, they are engaged in raising 
a new consciousness among men. 
 Besides joining the military front, Kurdish women at the same time 
actively engaged in political activities all around Kurdistan and in exile.  
However, due to the denials and bans of the Turkish government, it was in 
Europe - not Kurdistan - that the women's organizations were first 
established. The Union of Patriotic Women from Kurdistan (YJWK) founded 
in 1987 in Germany, aimed at developing women's self-organization and 
struggling for women's liberation (KJB, 2011).  
 Women's political engagement and participation in guerrilla fighting 
developed in tandem. For those women trapped in an authoritarian society 
where armed oppression is the norm, taking up arms seems to be an 
essential step to defending themselves and transforming society. But this is 
not limited to targeting State forces and winning a military war. This is a way 
to change the position of women in society,  including the freedom movement 
itself. As stated by a male guerrilla: "We didn't want to accept it at first. 
Women by nature are physically weaker, and in war that hits you like a 
boomerang [...]" (Damon, n.d). For Ocalan, however, the participation of 
women in the guerrilla forces is a way for overcoming those "sexist mind-sets 
within the freedom movement [...] the synthetic dependence of women to 
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men" (Nurhak, n.d.). It can be argued that this was the first level of promotion 
of gender equality within the Kurdish society in the PKK era. Although 
supported by Ocalan, Kurdish women themselves had to struggle to 
convince men that they were equal comrades, and thus legitimize their full 
engagement in warfare. Women's participation in guerrilla increased 
qualitatively and quantitatively, leading to the formation of women's guerrilla 
units in 1993, and later to a women's own army, the Free Women's Army.      
  The awareness of an intertwined struggle - political and military - was 
conducive to the establishment of a more comprehensive women's 
organization, which would be able to include guerrilleras as well as 
representatives of political and social organizations. In 1995, the Kurdistan 
Free Women's Union (YAJK) (with the participation of Sakine Cansiz) was 
formed in the mountains of Kurdistan. At this point women had already 
gained some experience from the formation of their army. The new 
organization would be an important element in the process of developing 
women's own social and political perspectives instead of copying male 
organizations or reducing the female army to a back-up force. At the same 
time, this broader organization would play a central role in establishing an 
international network (that would be able to act as a united front), as it aimed 
at incorporating both the experiences on the battlefront, and at the 
international level (KJB, 2011).                       
 This international representation fostered the association with other 
women's organizations. Consequently, the incorporation of human rights 
language and the development of an expertise to access human rights 
mechanisms marked the growth and maturation of the Kurdish women's 
movement. Through the partnership with the Women's International 
Democratic Federation (WIDF), based in Paris, Kurdish women were 
represented at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. 
In her statement the president of the federation condemned the 
imprisonment of female political activists in several countries, including Kurds 
in Turkey, specifically Leyla Zana1. As highlighted by Kilic Nursel (2014), a 																																																								
1 Leyla Zana was the first Kurdish woman to gain a seat in the Parliament of Ankara. 
In 1994 she became internationally famous for being arrested and imprisoned (10 
years) after pronouncing her inaugural speech in the Parliament in Kurdish. 
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female Kurdish activist, it was the first time that Kurdish women were able to 
make their voice heard at the international level and aligned with a universal 
feminist language. 
 The end of the 1990s was a decisive moment for the Kurdish women's 
movement. On the symbolic date of the 8th of March 1998, Ocalan 
announced the "Women's Liberation Ideology" in which he integrated the 
struggle of Kurdish women with the struggle of women all over the world2 
(Nurhak, n.d). Several educational seminars were promoted by YAJK to 
discuss and enhance those principles, and primarily to promote "the 
transformation of men". It is important to highlight that the situation of the 
PKK fighters in the Kurdish mountains, a de facto stateless region, was a 
force for the development of a revolutionary ideology. Breaking off from the 
sovereign system fomented the construction of new values and systems of 
thought. This process of education is particularly significant for female 
fighters (Nurhak, n.d.), since women in Turkish society have less access to 
formal education than men. According to the "Functional Adult Literacy and 
Women's Support Programme" (Unesco, 2011), in 2011, still 3 million adults 
over the age of 15 in Turkey could not read or write their own names, 
amongst which the majority were women. Of the 3.8 million adults who only 
have an elementary school education, 70% are women.  
  Flach (2007 cited in Westrheim, 2008, p.28) stresses that the majority 
of women who joined the PKK in the 1990s were illiterate3. They were 
motivated by guerrilleras who visited the villages to inform them about the 
PKK and teach them literacy. After joining the movement, studying - and 
developing a stronger political consciousness - became an essential element 
of the struggle. Without knowing why you fight, you cannot cope with the 
hard life in the guerrilla. In this sense, it is important to emphasize the 
considerations made by Westrheim (2008) on the concepts of critical and 																																																								
2 Its basic principles were already addressed in chapter two.  
 
3 On the other hand, as pointed out by the author, the women who joined the PKK in 
the 1970s and 1980s were university or high school students. As analysed before, 
the PKK was formed by a group of educated students who were in contact with 
universal revolutionary ideals. The alternative educational system developed by the 
organization would be a fundamental mechanism to spread these ideals and recruit 
new activists.		
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political literacy and how they are put into practice within the alternative 
education system developed by the PKK. The educative process is never 
neutral. In a culture of silence, oppressive education takes place, which 
means that people are taught to accept the hegemonic discourse. For a 
critical education, however, consciousness and transformation are 
fundamental. It aims at breaking the silence and making people aware of 
their conditions and democratic rights, allowing them to participate in 
decision-making processes. The PKK does not only teach people to read and 
write. It teaches them to critically and politically "read" their reality, 
encouraging them to use knowledge as a tool for changing society.  
 Moreover, critical and political literacy do not only reach illiterate 
people, but everyone. This is key to understanding the social and political 
strength of the Kurdish women's transnational network. Even in the diaspora, 
where women have full opportunities to be educated, the process of critical 
and political literacy continuous to play a vital role. The educational activities, 
such as seminars, workshops, and the extensive use of the media work 
towards the dissemination of Ocalan's ideas, which critically address issues 
like state, capitalism, patriarchy, and religion, and reinforce the main goal to 
liberate women. Women in Kurdistan and in the diaspora are taught to 
critically understand, through the study of history, why patriarchy was 
established as the "natural" system, and in doing so they are also taught to 
restore the value of women within society. Finally, people do not simply 
"receive" education. They actively participate in the construction of the 
education process through the permanent sharing of their own knowledge 
and experiences.  
 It was exactly the critical exercise over the engagement of women in 
the military actions, self-organization, the ability to defend themselves and 
develop free thought (Nurhak, n.d.) that led to the establishment of the first 
women's party in 1999, the Kurdistan Working Women's Party (PJKK). The 
party would change its name twice as a result of its ongoing reformulation 
and concurrent widening of perspectives and practical activities. Following 
the principles of the "Women's Liberation Ideology", it also took into account 
the experiences of non-Kurdish women, opening itself to the universal 
struggle of women. In 2002 the party prepared a draft for a "Women's Social 
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Contract", which was introduced to other women's organizations through 
several conferences and other activities. Additionally, the group worked to 
reinforce joint actions with international organizations and develop a human 
rights language within the movement.      
 Equally important, as argued by Çaglayan (2012, p.15), is the fact that 
the concept of a women's social contract - as distinct from a social contract 
made by men - leads to a new social organization in which women are 
subjects rather than objects. Contrary to what commonly defines ethnic-
national processes, in the Kurdish case the women who set forth biding 
conditions for men to abide by. More significantly, the formulation of a 
contract represented a key achievement to the Kurdish women's movement. 
As already discussed, Ocalan emphatically addresses the necessity to 
"change man's mentality and life. [...] Gender revolution is not just about 
woman" (Ocalan, 2013, p.51). Despite the remaining difficulties to overcome 
the limits and framework of patriarchy (Guneser, 2014), the women's social 
contract reinforced the practical means to put into practice the women's 
liberation ideology. In 2004, the women's party was renamed the Kurdistan 
Women’s Liberation Party (PAJK), which is still in use.  
 The Kurdish women's movement is continuously restructuring itself. 
The development of new paradigms within the overall Kurdish movement - 
notably democracy, ecology and women's freedom - demanded the 
establishment of a flexible and comprehensive women's organization that 
transcends party structures (Guneser, 2014). With this aim, an umbrella 
organization called the High Women's Council (KJB) was created in 2005 
with the participation of women from all parts of Kurdistan and the diaspora. 
Structurally, it aimed at functioning as a coordination point between the 
ideological women's party (PAJK); the self-defence forces, the Free 
Women's Units Star - YJA Star (a development of the Free Women's Army 
founded in 1993); the social and political mass organizations, the Free 
Women's Union (YJA) (which developed from the Kurdistan Free Women's 
Union (YAJK), founded in 1995); and the Young Women's Organization (a 
result of the establishment of the KJB). In 2014, KJB would change its name 
to Kurdistan Women's Communities (KJK).  
	 32	
 Before addressing the experience of women's organizations in Europe, 
it is worth summarizing the organizational structure of the Kurdish women's 
movement. This will help to clarify the position of the diaspora organizations 
within the transnational network, and how they contribute to spread the 
women's liberation ideology and to put into practice its principles.   
 With the objective to build up "a democratic confederation in order to 
establish a democratic, ecological society based on gender equality" (KJB, 
2011), the KJK coordinates the work developed by the various women's 
organizations in the different areas of struggle. As a confederative 
organization, it plays a leading role in directing the movement throughout its 
various axes of action, towards the achievement of a "women-centred social 
democratization". As such, the alliance with international organizations and 
the formation of a transnational network for the development of common 
projects is a fundamental strategy.  
 The ideological and political party, the PAJK, is responsible for 
spreading the women's liberation ideology and educating female cadres on 
its principles. It carries out research, including studies of literature, culture, 
art, politics, diplomacy, economy, and the press. It encourages the 
establishment of women's academies to develop an alternative educational 
system. The PAJK is also responsible for the implementation of an 
interdisciplinary approach that breaks with the patriarchal historiography - 
which means putting into practice the concept of Jineolojî, or "science of 
women", as developed by Ocalan (discussed in chapter two). 
 The Free Women's Units Star is the armed branch of the women's 
movement. It characterizes itself as the "field of legitimate self-defence" of 
the freedom struggle. With the violent conditions of life in Kurdistan and the 
Middle East, where Kurds (and especially Kurdish women) are exposed to 
myriad threats, attacks, and violations of fundamental human rights, taking 
up arms is seemingly essential for the protection of women, as well as men 
and children. As synthesized by a guerrillero that I met in the Kandil 
Mountains in 2010, "in the Middle East if you do not take up guns nobody 
listens to you". The women's movement, as well as the overall Kurdish 
movement, is engaged in establishing long-standing peace through 
democratic and political means. However, laying down weapons is not yet 
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deemed a viable solution. The recent political developments, wherein Turkey 
declared war against both the Islamic State (IS) and the PKK (levelling them 
as equally terrorists), make the shared feeling of insecurity among Kurds 
understandable. The last peace negotiations were stalled in the worst way 
last July. For years now, Kurds have been intensively fighting an unfair war 
against IS, which invades cities, destroys archaeological and historical 
monuments, beheads people and brutally exposes their bodies on the 
Internet, kidnaps women and children, turns women into sexual slaves, and 
imposes obscurantist interpretations of the Islamic faith. Patrice Franceschi 
(2015), a French writer and humanitarian activist who visited Kobane several 
times since the beginning of the struggle, defines the war between IS and the 
Kurds as the war of "Islamist fanatics" against "democratic fanatics". In his 
book he captures a detailed description of the daily lives of the Kurdish 
combatants, and critically questions why the West has not been fully 
supportive of Kurds, who tirelessly fight for the same values claimed as "our" 
values. The role of women in war and their position in Kurdish society is a 
key aspect addressed by Franceschi, who poetically defines them as the 
"Fire Female Amazons". In the opposite direction of the critical 
considerations made by the author, Turkey has engaged in savage fighting 
against the PKK and the Kurdish political parties, but far less against the 
Islamic State. Almost every day, the Turkish Air Forces conduct strikes - 
more than 150 by the middle of August - in Northern Iraq and on its own 
territory against the PKK bases. In the same time period, there were only 
three bombings in Syria targeting the Islamic State. War, and this one 
particularly, is above all politics, where propaganda has as much weight as 
weapons (Semo, 2015).  
 Since the beginning of this new wave of "war on terror" in July 2015, 
the Turkish state has committed several human rights violations and war 
crimes. Kurdish villages were bombed, killing dozens of civilians, including 
children. Turkish forces arbitrarily arrested dozens of Kurdish militants and 
politicians. At the same time, the Turkish right's political strategy has served 
to consolidate sexism and misogyny. Verbal attacks on left-wing women and 
male chauvinism in mainstream media are dominant on the political scene 
(Tremblay, 2015), and on the battlefield Turkish misogyny assumes even 
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more violent proportions. On August 10, Kurdish women and women's rights 
groups in Turkey were shocked and enraged at an act of sexualized torture 
committed by Turkish police as photos of the corpse of a female Kurdish 
militant were leaked online. According to those who prepared her body for 
burial, it is likely that after she was shot, she was stripped of her uniform, 
dragged by the neck with a rope through town, and abandoned in the town 
square. Afterwards, she was photographed and the photos of her naked and 
bloodied corpse were purposely exposed online at an attempt to humiliate 
the Kurds - and especially Kurdish women (Ackerman, 2015).   
 Finally, the Free Women's Union (YJA) and the Committee of Young 
Women gather the social and political mass organizations (including those in 
the diaspora) that struggle daily to promote human rights and change society 
from the grassroots. From the smallest levels of the organization within 
villages, neighbourhoods, and districts, they are organized under assemblies 
and councils. They work to guarantee cooperation and solidarity from the 
smallest local organizations to the largest transnational assemblies. Through 
the development of campaigns, social projects, and legal assistance, the 
grassroots organizations under the YJA take direct action against the 
violation of women's rights, such as honour killings, domestic violence, forced 
marriage, rape, circumcision, stoning to death, and polygamy. They also act 
on behalf of the self-determination of the Kurdish people and their cultural 
rights. The youth organizations, in their turn, in addition to working on the 
various issues mentioned above, aim to mobilize the new generations to 
"incorporate the dynamism of youth with the consciousness of women’s 
freedom for playing an active role in changing and transforming the society" 
(KJB, 2011). Which also means promoting the sense of responsibility for the 
historical continuity of the women's struggle.   
 As already argued, Kurdish women's political awareness developed 
alongside their sense of self-protection. What substantially differentiates the 
Kurdish women's groups - and the overall Kurdish movement - from other 
armed groups, is the fact that despite the use of weapons their main goal is 
by no means to perpetuate war. Since the beginning of the 1990s the PKK, 
under the philosophical and political leadership of Ocalan, has been trying to 
establish peace and dialogue. This is evidenced by the several unilateral 
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ceasefires declared by the PKK and the continuous restructuring of the 
movement to establish more democratic configurations and incorporate a 
human rights language. Above all, the development of the women's liberation 
ideology as the basis of the movement is proof of its commitment to 
democracy. Despite the context of armed conflict and ethnic repression, 
Kurdish society has been gradually changing from the bottom; people are 
raising awareness of the fact that peace can only be achieved if the 
microstructures of power are transformed - and which are fundamentally 
based on gender oppression. Thus, the principle of gender parity was 
established in all levels of the representational system of the PKK, as well as 
in all political bodies and civil society organizations in the Kurdish regions of 
Turkey and Syria, and in the diaspora. Two co-chairs, a man and a woman, 
head every organization. Moreover, women have established autonomous 
bodies and organizations in Kurdish regions and the diaspora. 
 Kurdish women in the diaspora play a central role in addressing 
Kurdish issues through a human rights approach, agitating and organizing to 
put the "Kurdish question", and particularly Kurdish women's issues, on the 
international agenda. Consequently, they are main actors in the process of 
strengthening the Kurdish women's movement. The last section of this 
dissertation focuses on the activities developed by specific Kurdish women's 
organizations in Europe and their role in promoting gender equality and 
human rights.       
 
"Liberation for Sinjar Women is Liberation for Humanity": The role of 
the diaspora in promoting human rights 
 
The 2000s were decisive for the structuring of Kurdish women's 
organizations in Europe and the strengthening of Kurdish women's 
representation as a whole. Popular assemblies, as well as various civil 
society organizations, associations and foundations were created and 
organized under umbrella organizations at national levels, leading to the 
establishment of a major umbrella organization, the European Kurdish 
Women's Movement (TJKE). The European organization held its second 
General Assembly in June 2015, with the participation of 115 delegates from 
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several European countries. The "construction of free life and democratic 
nation" was identified as its main field of struggle, making specific reference 
to the support of the "Rojava Revolution" and the resistance against the 
Islamic State (ANF News, 2015).  
 Thus, the TJKE highlighted the importance to reinforce the campaign 
"Liberation for Sinjar Women is Liberation for Humanity". Headed by a 
transnational coalition of Kurdish feminist organizations, the campaign was 
launched in September 2014, a month after the massacre committed by IS in 
the Yazidi city of Sinjar. With no international aid, the Kurdish fighters from 
the PKK and the Syrian Kurdish People's Defence Units (YPG), and its 
women's brigade, the YPJ, opened a humanitarian corridor from the Shengar 
Mountains in Iraq to Rojava, rescuing ten thousand people. However, 
hundreds, possibly thousands of people were abducted by IS. Hundreds of 
men were killed and others forced to convert to Islam under death threats. 
Hundreds of women and girls were sold, given as gifts or forced to marry the 
fighters or their supporters. Many of them have been subjected to torture and 
ill treatment, including rape and other types of sexual violence. Up to 300 had 
managed to escape by the end of 2014, but the majority continue to be held 
captives (Amnesty International, 2014).     
 The campaign aims at raising awareness of public opinion on the 
atrocities committed by IS and pressing any party with influence on IS to 
secure the immediate release of the captives. It also calls on the UN and the 
member states to condemn the countries that give financial, logistical and 
military support to IS, such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. As concrete 
actions, it requests psychological and therapeutic treatment for women, and 
the deployment of doctors, lawyers and sociologists for the establishment of 
long-term projects (Roj Women's Association, 2014).  
 Besides the support to the current struggle in Syria, two political 
claims permanently shape the diaspora's political agenda: "freedom for 
Ocalan" and "lift the ban on the PKK". On 13 February 2015 an international 
petition for the liberation of Ocalan and political prisoners in Turkey was 
presented to the Council of Europe. Launched in 2010 by the "International 
Initiative Freedom for Ocalan - Peace in Kurdistan", supporters managed to 
collect 10.3 million signatures, including as first signatories several renowned 
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politicians, human rights activists and scholars. The next day more than 
10.000 people from France, Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg 
gathered in the streets of Strasbourg to claim the liberation of Ocalan4.  
 Women were actively involved in the petition process, from the 
collection of signatures to its presentation in Strasbourg. For instance, the 
spokesperson of the demonstration was a female Kurdish activist, Hélène 
Erin. She insisted that Kurds also demand a political status for Kurdistan and 
the removal of the PKK's name from the European Union's terrorist list. 
Moreover, she stressed that the demonstration was in solidarity with the 
Kurds who are fighting against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Léonard, 
2015).   
 Various authors raised the fact that the Kurdish diaspora is highly 
committed to bringing visibility and support to the Kurdish cause (Baser, 
2013a, 2013b; Curtis, 2005; Eccarius-Kelly, 2002; Khayati, 2008; Van 
Bruinessen, 1999, 2000). This continuous "homeland orientation", as 
observed by Khayati (2008), is a key element of the discourse and practices 
of the Kurdish diaspora. However, the social and political commitment to 
one's place of origin acquired a broader meaning in the Kurdish struggle, 
especially among women. It is not limited to solving local problems; above all, 
it is ideological. Kurds in the diaspora are committed to their territory, which 
is inseparable from the reproduction of Kurdish identity, and the struggle for 
the right of self-determination. Yet they are aware that the Kurdish problem - 
and the problem of all peoples in the Middle East - is deeper, and society 
must be changed from the foundations. In this sense, the "Rojava 
Revolution" has a strong symbolic appeal to Kurds. It offers the concrete 
possibility to building up a new model of society, based on democratic values, 
secularism, and gender equality. In sum, it means putting into practice the 
ideas developed by Ocalan.  
 The Islamic State, on the other hand, is more than a war enemy and 
invader. It is the materialization of a barbaric male mentality, a "threat to all 
humanity" physically and ideologically. But the fundamentalist organization is 																																																								
4 Since 1999, public demonstrations are held all around Europe on or near the date 
of Ocalan's imprisonment (15 February).   
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just the maximal expression of this mentality. In the various countries of the 
Middle East, including those with good relations with the West, women are 
often subject to discriminatory legislation and/or practices, and 
institutionalized violence. For Kurdish women, the AKP (the Turkish 
president's party) and IS share the same "savage mentality". Whereas the 
guerrilleras are engaged in bringing down the barbaric reign of IS, the 
women's organizations are politically engaged in overthrowing the AKP's 
mentality (ANF News, 2015).  
 The Kurdish women's movement, acting as a united front from 
Kurdistan to Europe, is engaged in a long-term process of transforming 
society, which means on an immediate level the Kurdish territories in Turkey 
and Syria. In this sense, the organizations in the diaspora play a central role. 
As examined by Ostergaard-Nielsen (2006, p.8), they are the ones who are 
directly committed to gaining international political leverage, and with this aim, 
the use of human rights conventions as a platform for dialogue constitutes an 
essential step forward. In the Kurdish case, women were especially engaged 
in the transformation of the PKK into a socio-political movement (rather than 
a military offensive), and they continue to play a major role in formulating 
Kurdish claims in universal terms backed up by human rights instruments.  
 Generally speaking, the women's organizations in the diaspora are 
committed to two levels of action: lobbying and diplomatic work, which focus 
on bringing the women's liberation ideology into public spheres; and 
developing socio-cultural projects and activities, which aim at empowering 
women from a bottom-up perspective. Joint activities, such as campaigns, 
are often developed. Below I will address the institutional objectives of two 
women's organizations in Europe, which operate on different levels of action, 
as well as some specific activities and projects developed by them since 
2013.  
 
International Representation of the Kurdish Women's Movement 
 
The International Representation of the Kurdish Women's Movement, based 
in Paris, was founded in 2013 in Zurich, Switzerland. It is responsible for 
lobbying and diplomatic relations aiming at disseminating the women's 
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liberation ideology. The objectives of the organization can be grouped in six 
major focus areas: peace and conflict resolution; equality; dialogue and 
political activism; women's rights; self-determination; and mobilizing public 
opinion. The establishment of political networks and the development of joint 
activities with various women's organizations at the international level are key 
action strategies for accomplishing its objectives (Delahaie, Kilic and Akkaya, 
2014, pp.92-93). Nursel Kilic, member of the International Movement, 
explains that the organization is also part of the European Kurdish Women's 
Movement (TJKE), but it has the specific role of communicating with non-
Kurdish women worldwide. In sum, the organization is committed to 
informing and raising public awareness about women's rights in order to 
promote "the evolution of mentalities and the construction of a (global) 
society free of relations of domination" (Kilic, 2015).  
 It is important to highlight that the objectives of the organization are 
based on a human rights platform, with two objectives specifically focussing 
on implementing human rights instruments: the CEDAW and the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325, which addresses the impact of war on women and 
their pivotal role in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable 
peace. Furthermore, the principle of self-determination is addressed at two 
levels: the right to self-determination of the Kurdish people, and women's 
right to self-determination. The latter can be understood as women's 
reproductive rights, which comprises the right to legal and safe abortion, birth 
control, and access to good quality reproductive healthcare.  
 As discussed above, the women's organizations in Europe are 
permanently engaged in the campaigns "freedom for Ocalan" and "lift the 
ban on the PKK", which are viewed as basic conditions for the promotion of 
longstanding peace in Kurdistan. Due to the current political situation, the 
"Rojava Revolution" and the resistance against the Islamic State were added 
to the agenda as matters of urgency. The International Representation plays 
a central role in sustaining public visibility around the political and ideological 
issues behind the scenes. The promotion and participation in conferences, 
publishing of written material, campaigns, public demonstrations, press 
interviews and Internet activism are main mechanisms to unsure that visibility.  
	 40	
 One week after the assassination of the three female activists in Paris, 
a public march was organized from the Kurdish Cultural Centre in Paris, on 
Enghien Street, towards the Kurdistan Information Office, on Lafayette Street, 
where the crime took place. Since then it continues to be held every 
Wednesday from 1pm. According to Kilic, who co-organizes the march: 
 
This march was organized quite naturally. For two years the 
purpose of this manifestation is to protest against the silence 
surrounding the case, the silence of the Turkish state, the silence 
of the French state, the silence of Europe surrounding a case 
where three women defenceless, three revolutionaries, three 
feminists, died. And also one of the fundamental objectives is to 
raise public awareness [...]. It's really a recall, a way of attracting 
the attention of people passing by... [...]. The march will continue 
until the case is solved (Rue 89, 2015).   
 
 The "Wednesday's March" is a good example of the persistent 
character of Kurdish activism. Just a few days after the crime, various 
Kurdish organizations in Kurdistan and the diaspora, as well as international 
human rights organizations (Amnesty International, Women's Alliance, 
International Federation of Iraqi Refugees), the European coalition left Front 
(GUE/NGL Group), the Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC), and Stephen 
Smellie, a Scottish trade union activist, issued public statements and open 
letters repudiating the act and lobbying for a thorough and fast investigation. 
Moreover, one year later a "European Demonstration March for Truth and 
Justice" amassed thousands of people in Paris. But it is the "Wednesday's 
March", despite its small scale, that stands as the tireless demonstration of 
Kurdish women's resistance and denial of silence. Due to the permanent 
process of lobbying, advocacy and public demonstrations, a few steps were 
made in order to solve the case, as mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter. Nevertheless, the "Wednesday's March" will continue to be held until 
"truth is revealed" and "justice is made".  
  In January 2014, the International Representation of the Kurdish 
Women's Movement, together with the International Free Women's 
Foundation and partner organizations in France - "Femmes Solidaires" and 
France-Kurdistan Solidarity Association - organized a conference entitled 
"Taking action to oppose the killing of women in order to end femicide". The 
conference, which paid tribute to the three Kurdish activists murdered in 
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Paris, was held at the French Senate under the auspices of Éliane Assassi, 
president of the Communist, Republican and Citizen group (CRC). Various 
subjects were addressed, such as the history and concept of femicide, 
political murders in France and their legal aspects, strategies and modes of 
struggle against the slaughter of women by women's organizations in 
Kurdistan and France, and the recognition of femicide as a crime against 
humanity. Women activists from Iran and Djibouti also shared their 
experiences (ANF News, 2013). 
 The International Representation also co-organized in Rome, in 
October 2014, the conference "Practicing Freedom Against the Endless War 
of the Patriarchal System: Kurdish Women in Iraq, Syria, Europe", with the 
partnership of Kurdish international and local associations, and Italian non-
governmental organizations. The conference, which resulted in a publication 
with the same name, focused on the themes of femicide and the struggle 
against the patriarchal system; resistance against the Islamic State and the 
construction of a democratic society; the Sinjar massacre; the Rojava's 
Revolution; the implementation of CEDAW; and the role of women's 
organizations and activities before the international bodies for human rights.     
 Kilic represented the organization at the "First Conference of the 
International Feminist and Secular Network", which was held in Paris in 
November 2014. She joined the session "Femicide, from Judicial 
Terminology to Weapon of War. History and Foundation". The event counted 
the participation of journalists, sociologists, and women's associations from 
ten different countries (Femmes Solidaires, 2014). In an interview to the 
website 50/50, Kilic highlighted that "the Kurdish women claim themselves 
feminists and in favour of secularism. They fight against all the religious 
fundamentalists" (Kilic, 2015).     
 Since the 1970s, women have actively participated in the struggle 
between the PKK and the Turkish state. But their participation has not been 
limited to defending themselves and the Kurdish people. They have been 
deeply engaged in enhancing democratic values within the PKK and in 
Kurdish/Turkish society as a whole. If recent years have been especially 
difficult for women - the political assassinations in Paris, the Sinjar massacre, 
the continuous threat posed by the Islamic State to women's integrity, and 
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the reinforcement of AKP's misogynist policy - they also highlighted the 
transformative potential of women's liberation ideology. 
 Kurdish women in the diaspora are committed to raising public 
awareness on the current conflicts in the Middle East and gaining support for 
the Kurdish cause. Which means, for instance, calling on NATO to force 
Turkey to stop its undeclared support to the Islamic State and to shift its 
policy towards the PKK, resuming the peace process (Rûdaw, 2014). 
Women in the diaspora are committed to bringing visibility to the fact that 
supporting the Kurdish cause is supporting democratic values, and thus all of 
humanity. Kurds are fighting the Islamic State on the ground and blocking its 
territorial expansion, which makes it imperative to support Kurdish control 
over Rojava, the Syrian Kurdistan.  
 The International Representation of the Kurdish Women's Movement, 
together with other Kurdish women's organizations and activists, have taken 
a central position in informing public opinion about the "Rojava Revolution". 
Moreover, they are responsible for informing people that this Revolution was 
already on course before the attacks of the Islamic State, and that defeating 
the fundamentalist group is not the end of the process. The "Rojava 
Revolution" is the attempt to establish a new society in the Middle East, 
based on democracy and gender equality. For Kurds, it offers the concrete 
possibility to put into practice the ideas developed by Ocalan. For Kurdish 
women, the "Rojava Revolution" is above all the materialization of the 
women's liberation ideology.              
 Kilic Nursel, as representative of the International Representation, 
prepared an informative text to be shared online and to guide further 
interventions on the Kurdish women's movement and the "Rojava 
Revolution". It criticizes the sensationalist approach of the media and 
highlights the history of feminism among Kurdish women:  
The Kurdish women in Rojava are fully committed to the struggle 
and are one of the pillars of the so-called "Democratic Autonomy of 
Syrian Kurdistan". They have access to all levels of self-
government within the three Kurdish cantons5. It's a revolution 
within the revolution. This inter-revolution is the result of the 
Kurdish feminist tradition developed for nearly 40 years. [...] In the 
recent weeks the women of Rojava are the topic of the media. 																																																								
5 Administrative division of the Kurdish territory in Syria.  
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They're largely photographed but the real meaning of their struggle 
tends to be neglected. They're not just beautiful and charismatic 
figures, they're living shields that sacrifice themselves for the 
freedom of their people, and the protection of women and children. 
[...] (Kilic, 2014).             
 
 Kilic also explains the Kurdish struggle within the Syrian's civil war and 
the project to establish a political "third way" in the country, free from the 
dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad and the Islamic fundamentalism: 
 
Within a context of civil war, and taking into account that the 
opposition to Bashar al-Assad did not take into consideration the 
demands of the Kurds, a project of democratic autonomy started to 
be implemented in July 2012 in the Kurdish areas of Northern 
Syria. This project, led by the PYD, includes all ethnic groups in 
the region and aims at establishing a third way to free people from 
the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad and the Islamic 
fundamentalism. [...] In January 2014, pushing back the first 
Islamist military attacks, the autonomy of Rojava was proclaimed, 
and a democratic system established. A constitution was adopted 
recognizing three cantons, or sub-regions, with three million 
inhabitants: Djézireh, Afrin and Kobanê. The main values of this 
social contract are: equality [...]; education [...]; collective rights [...]; 
respect for identities [...]; secularism [...]; gender parity in all 
institutions [...]; and local self-governance (participatory 
democracy) [...] (Kilic, 2014).   
  
 
Women's Meeting UTAMARA6 
 
The Women's Meeting UTAMARA was created in 2006 by a network of 
Kurdish and European women. Based in the small city of Bonn, Germany, it 
aims to develop solutions to the diverse problems faced by women in Europe, 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish: adaptation to the host countries, domestic violence, 
trauma from war and genocide, honour killings, sexual mutilation, sexual 
torture, rape, and all other kinds of violence against women. A series of 
activities are carried out throughout each year to address these problems - 
many of them taboo - with the objective to raise general awareness and 
encourage the victims to claim their rights through specialized mechanisms. 
The group also aims to strengthen solidarity among women through various 
mechanisms: regional and international campaigns; themed events; weekend 																																																								
6 Information about the UTAMARA centre, its activities and projects are available at 
the website of the institution. 	
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seminars; courses; holiday camps; conferences; and symposiums. Five main 
programs offer support to the victims: 
 
• Counselling migrant women victims of violence: since 2009, the centre 
has developed the project "Violence is not a Fate: learning together 
with women". It offers supportive counselling, information and peer 
support groups for women with traumatic life experiences, such as 
war and domestic violence. Individual consultation can be held 
personally or by phone, anonymously or not. Co-creating solutions 
with the woman seeking help is a fundamental value and key strategy.  
• Psychological support: many women who are exposed to violence feel 
hopeless, guilty, ashamed and/or afraid. To overcome these feelings 
and build up new life alternatives, the centre offers psychological 
counselling.  
• Legal assistance: many women who are exposed to violence are not 
aware of their basic rights, which limit their claims and demands. 
UTAMARA advises women on violence protection law, right of 
residence, immigration law, family law, social law and general 
equality law.    
• Structural assistance: UTAMARA gives women the necessary 
information on the host country’s bureaucratic structure, guiding them 
to related institutions, including support around children and family 
needs.  
• Contacts with other counselling centres and agencies: UTAMARA 
provides information on Help Desks and state counselling centres 
specialized on sensitive issues related to cultural backgrounds, such 
as forced marriage and honour killings. 
 
 Although especially concerned with assisting women in Europe, 
UTAMARA is also engaged in enhancing women's rights in Kurdistan. The 
centre is a member of the campaign "Liberation for Sinjar Women is 
Liberation for Humanity", headed by a transnational coalition of Kurdish 
feminist organizations. While organizations such as the International 
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Representation of the Kurdish Women's Movement carry out diplomatic 
activities, UTAMARA develops local activities and long-term aid projects to 
be implemented in the Kurdish areas. For instance, in August 2014 the 
centre organized an informational day on the situation of women in the war 
against the Islamic State. Held in the town of Neuwied, it offered an 
information booth and a performance on the women's slave markets aimed at 
driving public attention to the brutal violence to which women in Iraq and 
Syria are exposed. The centre set up a bank account for raising funds for the 
promotion of humanitarian aid to refugees, particularly the hundreds of 
thousands of women and girls who have fled from the Sinjar region. 
Moreover, it permanently provides people with information on the situation on 
the ground, personally or by phone. As many of the women assisted by 
UTAMARA come from the Middle East, the centre aims at giving specialized 
support for those concerned about the condition of family and friends.  
 UTAMARA has deep experience with refugee women, and some of its 
activities are especially designed to help them to overcome the trauma of war. 
Besides the permanent support available at the centre (psychological, legal, 
etc.), it acts to improve the basic conditions of refugee women's daily lives. 
With this aim, it joined the feminist organization "Women in Exile & Friends" 
in the programme "Refugee Women are Getting Loud! Action Tour Across 
Germany" developed during the summer of 2014. In addition to public 
demonstrations to draw attention to the situation of refugee women and 
children, a group of delegates visited several accommodations for asylum 
seekers in different German cities, where they spoke with female residents 
about their problems and concerns. Those women, who had already suffered 
the impacts of war and the traumatic experience of fleeing, are exposed to 
humiliating experiences, discrimination, and social exclusion in the host 
countries. Furthermore, even in Europe they are still exposed to violence and 
sexual harassment. After the obligatory period of up to three months in an 
"initial reception centre", where the procedures for asylum demand take 
place, refugees are accommodated in one of the two types of 
accommodation available in Germany: the "collective accommodation 
shelters", and the "decentralized accommodation (apartments)". However, 
there is no legal obligation to provide separate facilities for families, single 
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women or other vulnerable groups in the collective centres (Asylum 
Information Database, n.d.). After the tour, the women's organizations 
addressed a series of demands to the relevant authorities, including the 
abolishment of collective centres and the exclusive accommodation of 
refugees in apartments.           
 The centre develops specific activities focusing on young and older 
women. According to the United Nations (2011), the number of people aged 
60 and over is increasing faster than at any other time in history. But the 
increase in numbers has also shed light on the lack of adequate protection 
mechanisms, policies and programmes to address the challenges faced by 
this age group. Poverty is the most pressing challenge to the welfare of older 
people, and it can reach dire levels when age is experienced alongside 
gender, ethnic, and health status discrimination. During the celebration of the 
International Women's Day in March 2014, the UTAMARA centre promoted 
an open conversation on the issue of poverty and older women. At this 
occasion, it focused on the negative consequences of the patriarchal 
structures on women's empowerment in economic life. Under the title 
"Poverty Among Old-Age Women: Working for a Lifetime and Aged Badly 
Off!?", women from different generations and ethnic backgrounds, many of 
them migrants, exchanged views and personal testimonies on interrupted 
work histories due to child-bearing and situations where they did not work 
due to cultural barriers. An action-oriented session, the discussion included 
potential solutions, such as alternative forms of housing, access to child care 
facilities, and part-time work.        
 Issues concerning young women were addressed in a weeklong 
summer camp organized in the same year. Women aged 15 to 25 years old, 
from different backgrounds, helped to organize and participated in various 
seminars and recreational activities. Seminars included discussions on 
sexism and prospects for action, self-confidence, "beauty" in capitalist 
societies, and conflicts on cultural identity. In regards to the last issue, many 
young women who are born or raised in Europe are more oriented to a 
"European way of life", which may conflict with traditional family values. 
Through UTAMARA's efforts, women learn about their rights - for example, 
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the prohibition of forced marriage - and are encouraged to study and learn a 
profession.     
 In accordance with the principles fostered by the women's liberation 
ideology: "changing men's mentality and life", UTAMARA promotes activities 
exclusively directed to men to support them to eliminate patriarchal attitudes 
and behaviour. A weekend seminar entitled "Strong Men Say NO to Bride 
Price and Forced Marriage" was organized in 2013. With 25 participants from 
different regions of the Middle East and varied age groups, the presentations 
were conducted in Kurdish, Turkish and Arabic, always making use of 
examples from everyday life. The discussions were divided in three panels: 
history of patriarchal oppression, forms of violence against women and their 
impacts on society; women's history and history of gender roles; and 
solutions to overcome violence in society today. As highlighted by the 
organizers, the seminar was specifically designed for men who reject violent 
behaviours and seek alternative options. This self-selection ensured their full 
involvement in the discussions of practical issues, such as bride price and 
forced marriage. Some even admitted to having requested payment for their 
daughters, but were open to reconsider it as a major factor contributing to 
domestic violence and gender inequality, which in its turn has a negative 
effect on society as a whole. The seminar was supported by the regional 
representative of the Ministry of Migration and Integration.    
 The centre's time-limited activities can germinate into long-term 
projects. For instance, the men's weekend seminar developed into the 
project "NO to Bride Price, Forced Marriage and Honour Killings!". Despite 
the efforts of various civil organizations and the government to prevent and 
combat violence against women, women and girls are still victims of these 
crimes in Germany. The project targets women in a vulnerable situation, 
particularly from the Middle East, whose religious and sociocultural 
backgrounds legitimize bride price, forced marriage and crimes in the name 
of "honour". It also targets their families (including men), and their 
environment. In total, the objectives of the project aim to impact 3000 people. 
Based on a participatory methodology, the disseminators of the project are 
women with migrant backgrounds who are capable of teaching intercultural 
skills. Although previous projects focused on the evaluation of trauma caused 
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by violence, war, and migration experiences, the current focuses on the 
prevention of the three forms of violence mentioned above. There are three 
main types of activities. Educational seminars, with discussions on the 
impacts and consequences of violence on the individual and social levels, 
are held for groups of women, men, and mixed gender groups. There also 
discussions on the mechanisms and possibilities in each municipality to 
prevent or intervene in cases of violence. The second is the work of press 
and public relations, which is done in partnership with the municipalities and 
with the inclusion of native languages, and aims at reaching a broader public. 
And third, the project works to establish a network of action through the 
participation of disseminators, specialists and existing institutions.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) emerged as a response to years of 
intensive repression of the Kurdish people. After the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, the Kurds were deprived of territorial, cultural and political 
rights. The military coup of 1980 increased the repression, with thousands of 
people imprisoned and submitted to systematic torture. Within a context of 
political instability and authoritarianism, legal ways of organizing a national 
movement seemed exhausted, opening the path to armed resistance. The 
PKK rapidly gained broad popular support and evolved from a small 
clandestine organization into a powerful transnational social-political 
movement, including armed guerrillas (women and men), a media complex, 
and civil society organizations. The successful popular mobilization can be 
mainly attributed to three factors: its emergence as a supra-tribal resistance; 
the promotion of political education; and the commitment to gender equality. 
In the 2000s the PKK switched from being a party to a congressional system, 
abandoned the aim of an independent Kurdistan, and embraced the thesis of 
"democratic modernity", based on a democratic, ecological and gender-
emancipatory system. 
  Based on the new paradigms, Ocalan developed a comprehensive 
approach to women's liberation. Besides the ideological discussions he 
encouraged women to surpass gender roles and create their own 
movements and institutions. This ideological framework is devoted to 
democratic values, such as secularism, women's empowerment and gender 
equality. Moreover, Ocalan directly addressed the fact that the transformation 
of men's patriarchal mentality is one of the most important steps to establish 
a democratic society.    
 In addition to the emergence of the PKK and its consolidation as a 
social-political movement, the Kurdish women's movement must be analysed 
in its transnational dimension. Due to Turkey's political situation and the 
historical denial of fundamental human rights of its Kurdish population, the 
"exile experience", particularly in Europe, was a key element in the 
establishment of a Kurdish women's liberation movement. The exile 
	 50	
experience led to the organization of women in a united front, from the 
guerrilleras on the battlefields to women's organizations in the diaspora.  
 Although supported by Ocalan, Kurdish women themselves struggled 
to convince men that they were equal comrades, and in doing so legitimized 
their full engagement in warfare. They successfully established the principle 
of gender parity in all levels of the representational system of the PKK, as 
well as in all political bodies and civil society organizations in the Kurdish 
regions of Turkey, Syria, and the diaspora. Two co-chairs, a man and a 
woman, head every organization. Moreover, women have established 
autonomous bodies.  
 The Kurdish women's movement, acting as a united front from 
Kurdistan to Europe, is engaged in a long-term process of transforming 
society. Organizations in the diaspora play a central role, committed to 
gaining international political influence and leveraging human rights 
conventions as a platform for dialogue. Furthermore, women were especially 
engaged in the transformation of the PKK into a socio-political movement 
from its roots as a military offensive, and they continue to play a major role in 
formulating Kurdish claims in universal terms backed up by human rights 
instruments. 
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